Higher-order thought and the problem of shifting subjectivity
In this paper, we argue that the two versions of the higher–order thought theory of consciousness, viz. Rosenthal’s extrinsic higher–order thought and Gennaro’s intrinsic higher–order thought, fail to explain the subjective character of a conscious mental state. Both these theories face what we call...
| Permalink: | http://skupni.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001055778/Details |
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| Matična publikacija: |
Obnovljeni život (Online) 74 (2019), 2 ; str. 161-179 |
| Glavni autori: | Chaturvedi, Madhu Mangal (Author), Sarma, A. V. Ravishankar |
| Vrsta građe: | e-članak |
| Jezik: | eng |
| Predmet: | |
| Online pristup: |
https://doi.org/10.31337/oz.74.2.2 Hrčak |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Chaturvedi, Madhu Mangal |4 aut |9 HR-ZaNSK | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Higher-order thought and the problem of shifting subjectivity |h [Elektronička građa] / |c Madhu Mangal Chaturvedi, A. V. Ravishankar Sarma. |
| 300 | |b Ilustr. | ||
| 504 | |a Bibliografske bilješke uz tekst ; bibliografija: str. 177-178. | ||
| 504 | |a Summary ; Sažetak. | ||
| 520 | |a In this paper, we argue that the two versions of the higher–order thought theory of consciousness, viz. Rosenthal’s extrinsic higher–order thought and Gennaro’s intrinsic higher–order thought, fail to explain the subjective character of a conscious mental state. Both these theories face what we call the problem of shifting subjectivity. Since these theories explain the consciousness of mental states in terms of a representational relation between two unconscious mental states with the help of a two–tiered representational structure divided into a higher–order thought and a lower–order mental state (which is the target of the higher–order thought), they fail to explain the subjective character of conscious mental states, which is intrinsic to them. In their account, the subjective character intrinsic to conscious mental states seems to shift from the target state to the higher–order mental state, which is separate from the target state. The objection is strong against Rosenthal’s extrinsic higher–order thought theory, which clearly makes a distinction between a world–directed mental state and the higher–order thought representing it. However, although Gennaro’s intrinsic higher–order thought theory is an attempt to preserve the intuition that consciousness is intrinsic to conscious mental states, it faces the problem of shifting subjectivity in the case of introspective consciousness. | ||
| 520 | |a U radu autori iznose tvrdnju da dvije verzije teorije svjesnosti tzv. misli višega reda, Rosenthalova ekstrinzična misao višega reda i Genarrova intrinzična misao višega reda, ne obrazlažu subjektivni karakter svjesnoga mentalnoga stanja. Obje teorije susreću se s takozvanim problemom subjektivnosti koja se pomiče. S obzirom da te teorije tumače svjesnost mentalnih stanja pomoću dvoslojne reprezentacijske strukture podijeljene na misao višega reda i mentalno stanje nižega reda (koje je meta misli višeg reda), one ne uspijevaju obrazložiti subjektivni karakter svjesnoga mentalnoga stanja koji im je intrinzičan. Prema njihovu tumačenju, subjektivni karakter intrinzičan svjesnim mentalnim stanjima pomiče se, čini se, sa stanja mete na mentalno stanje višega reda, koje je odvojeno od stanja mete. Autori upućuju ozbiljnu primjedbu na Rosenthalovu teoriju ekstrinzične misli višega reda, koja jasno razlikuje svijetu usmjereno mentalno stanje od misli višega reda, koja ga predstavlja. Međutim, iako Gennarova teorija intrinzične misli višega reda predstavlja pokušaj očuvanja intuicije da je svjesnost intrinzična svjesnim mentalnim stanjima, ona se susreće s problemom subjektivnosti koja se pomiče u slučaju introspektivne svjesnosti. | ||
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| 700 | 1 | |a Sarma, A. V. Ravishankar |4 aut |9 HR-ZaNSK | |
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