How do we know that we are free?
We are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others that we are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ‘up to us’ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from doing one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In this article, I probe thesource and...
| Permalink: | http://skupni.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001060264/Details |
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| Matična publikacija: |
European journal of analytic philosophy (Online) 15 (2019), 2 ; str. 79-97 |
| Glavni autor: | O’Connor, Timothy (Author) |
| Vrsta građe: | e-članak |
| Jezik: | eng |
| Predmet: | |
| Online pristup: |
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.4 Hrčak |
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| 100 | 1 | |a O’Connor, Timothy |4 aut |9 HR-ZaNSK | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a How do we know that we are free? |h [Elektronička građa] / |c Timothy O’Connor. |
| 500 | |a Bilješke uz tekst. | ||
| 504 | |a Bibliografske bilješke uz tekst ; bibliografija: str. 96-97. | ||
| 504 | |a Abstract. | ||
| 520 | |a We are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others that we are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ‘up to us’ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from doing one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In this article, I probe thesource and epistemic justification of our ‘freedom belief’. I propose an account that (unlike most) does not lean heavily on our first-personal experience of choice and action, and instead regards freedom belief as a priori justified. I will then consider possible replies available toincompatibilists to the contention made by some compatibilists that the ‘privileged’ epistemic status of freedom belief (which my account endorses) supports a minimalist, and therefore compatibilist view of the nature of freedom itself. | ||
| 653 | 0 | |a Sloboda |a Slobodna volja |a Inkompatibilizam |a Opravdanje |a Revizionizam |a Svjesnost | |
| 773 | 0 | |t European journal of analytic philosophy (Online) |x 1849-0514 |g 15 (2019), 2 ; str. 79-97 |w nsk.(HR-ZaNSK)000849430 | |
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