Logic Oughtn't be Normative
Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case that rational agents ought to reason logically. If the converse holds, and the exponent of logical normativity believes either (a) that it is false that rational agents ought to reason logically or (b) that the claim that rat...
Permalink: | http://skupni.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001094752/Description |
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Matična publikacija: |
Disputatio philosophica (Online) 22 (2020),1 ; str.3-10 |
Glavni autor: | Searle, Christopher J. (Author) |
Vrsta građe: | e-članak |
Jezik: | eng |
Online pristup: |
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