Knowledge and assertion
In the literature on assertion, there is a common assumption that having the knowledge that p is a sufficient condition for having the epistemic right to assert that p—call this the Knowledge is Sufficient for Assertion Principle, or KSA. Jennifer Lackey has challenged KSA based on several counterex...
| Permalink: | http://skupni.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001094807 |
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| Matična publikacija: |
European journal of analytic philosophy (Online) 16 (2020), 1 ; str. 33-52 |
| Glavni autor: | Anderson, Joshua (Author) |
| Vrsta građe: | e-članak |
| Jezik: | eng |
| Predmet: | |
| Online pristup: |
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.2 Hrčak European journal of analytic philosophy (Online) |
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https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.2Hrčak
European journal of analytic philosophy (Online)