Famine, affluence, and amorality

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments fo...

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Permalink: http://skupni.nsk.hr/Record/nsk.NSK01001137773/Details
Matična publikacija: European journal of analytic philosophy (Online)
17 (2021), 2 ; str. (A1)5-29
Glavni autor: Sackris, David (Author)
Vrsta građe: e-članak
Jezik: eng
Predmet:
Online pristup: https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.17.2.1
Hrčak
European journal of analytic philosophy (Online)
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100 1 |a Sackris, David  |4 aut  |9 HR-ZaNSK 
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504 |a Bibliografske bilješke uz tekst ; bibliografija: str. 25-29. 
504 |a Abstract ; Sažetak. 
520 |a I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer"s "Famine, Affluence, and Morality". Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot. 
520 |a Tvrdim da se rasprava o prirodi moralnog prosuđivanja u prvom licu, preciznije, pitanja o tome jesu li takvi moralni sudovi inherentno motivirajući (internalizam) ili se moralni sudovi mogu donijeti u nedostatku motivacije (eksternalizam) mogu temeljiti na pogrešnoj pretpostavci: da moralni sudovi čine posebnu vrstu koja mora imati neke zajedničke, bitne značajke u pogledu motivacije za djelovanje. Tvrdim da nema razloga za pretpostavku da moralni sudovi iz prvog lica čine homogenu klasu razmatrajući običan slučaj: studenti koji čitaju "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" Petera Singera. Ni internalisti ni eksternalisti ne mogu dati zadovoljavajuće objašnjenje zašto naši studenti ne postupaju u skladu sa svojim moralnim sudovima u ovom konkretnom slučaju, iako su u većini slučajeva motivirani djelovati u skladu sa svojim moralnim sudovima. Tvrdim da nemogućnost pružanja zadovoljavajućeg objašnjenja ima svoj izvor u uobičajenoj pretpostavci o prirodi moralnih sudova. Nakon što razmotrimo mogućnost odbacivanja tvrdnje da moralno odlučivanje iz prvog lica čini posebnu vrstu na način na koji se to obično pretpostavlja, rasprava o internalizmu/eksternalizmu se može smatrati spornom. 
653 0 |a Metaetika  |a Moralni sud  |a Internalizam  |a Eksternalizam 
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